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ABSTRACT 
 
Porter’s Industrial Cluster Theory (ICT) is a theoretical framework that achieved 
prominence in Australian economic policy development.  Despite its widespread 
adoption, however, Australia has remained significantly below the OECD average in 
terms of its industrial clusters’ contributions to real wealth creation. In order to 
understand the positive role that (Australian) governments can play in the development 
of industry clusters, this paper analyses the 25-year history of the Tasmanian Light 
Shipbuilding Industry cluster.  This analysis provides an insight into the set of 
government policy roles that facilitated the development of this internationally 
competitive industry cluster.  This paper also proposes a re-conceptualisation of ICT 
that will potentially increase its value as a predictive tool for regional economic 
development. 
 
 
 
Key words: Industrial cluster theory, role of government, cluster policy, regional 
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Regional Economic Development: 
Exploring the ‘Role of Government’ in Porter’s Industrial Cluster Theory. 
 
 
 
Introduction. 
 
Since the 1970s, the onrush of globalisation in Australia’s markets has presented 
significant economic policy challenges to the country’s federal and state governments 
(Everett, 2002; Goldfinch, 1999; Moustafine, 1999).  A major concern for Australian 
legislators was (and remains) the question as to how to make a nation previously 
protected by a ‘fortress’ of tariffs and subsidies more productive and competitive in 
world markets (Brown, 2000; Edwards, 2002; Martin, 2000; Quiggin, 1999).  One 
theoretical framework that achieved prominence in Australian economic policy 
development since its inception in 1990 is Porter’s Industrial Cluster Theory (ICT) (see 
Australian Manufacturing Council, 1994; Bureau of Industry Economics, 1991; 
Keating, 1994; Kelty, 1993; McKinsey & Company, 1994).   As part of his book The 
Competitive Advantage of Nations, Porter developed the notion that innovative 
industrial clusters are integral to export earnings and the generation of national 
competitive advantage.  Porter’s ICT argues that a nation’s industry will be 
internationally competitive if a synergistic interrelationship exists between four 
important variables collectively known as the Diamond Factor Model: ‘Factor 
Conditions’; ‘Local Demand Conditions’; ‘Related and Supporting Industries’; ‘Firm 
Strategy, Structure and Rivalry’; and the two influencing roles of ‘Chance Events’ and 
‘Government’. (See Porter (1990) for a discussion of the Diamond Factor Model, and 
Figure 1 for a diagrammatic representation). 
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Figure 1: Porter’s (1990) Diamond Factor Model. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Since the adoption of Porter’s Diamond Factor Model (DFM) as a basis for policy 
development, however, there has been considerable debate concerning its effectiveness, 
and indeed its appropriateness as a policy framework for Australia (see for example, 
Boddy, 2000; Gordon & McCann, 2000; Lyons, 1995; Wejland, 1999; Yla-Anttila, 
1994).  The debate has arisen due to the observed disconnect between the country’s 
numerous (and expensive) attempts to incorporate the DFM as a policy framework, and 
the fact that despite these efforts, Australia remains significantly below the OECD 
average in terms of its industrial clusters’ economic contributions to real wealth creation 
(Brown, 2000; OECD, 1998; Porter, 2002, cited in James, 2002).  
 
An examination of the literature identifies three main issues that account for the 
observed failures and under-performance of Australian industrial cluster policy.   The 
first major issue is that Australian government policy development has largely been 
focused on descriptive information gathering rather than on achieving either business 
participation in, or greater understanding of the complex industrial clustering process 
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(Davies, 2001).  In many of the failed or under-performing IC developments, 
researchers noted that the associated government policy ignored the local and inter-
regional industrial linkages and/or the channels of technology and knowledge transfer 
that existed, instead relying on relatively simple measures (such as ‘industry size’) to 
detect potential industry clusters.  These simplistic measures are a common feature of 
Australian industrial cluster policy, and formed the basis upon which expensive and 
complex resource allocations were made (Gordon & McCann, 2000).   
 
The second major issue surrounds an assumption by Australian policy-makers that the 
facts explaining the existence of industry clusters around the globe are readily 
generalisable to the Australian context (Boddy, 2000).  Of particular concern has been 
the assumption of Australian policy makers that simply replicating the policy choices of 
governments associated with successful clusters (such as Silicon Valley) will be 
successful despite the lack of evidence to support this contention.  Boddy (2000) 
suggests that there are clear dangers in attempting to reproduce significant policy 
direction from a relatively small number of specific cases, especially those whose 
economic performance is inherently atypical.  One of the major dangers of 
incorporating a ‘carbon copy’ approach to policy development is that of 
misunderstanding the specific origins and competencies inherent to a region’s economy 
(Boddy, 2000).  Without the specific insight into how the relationships and networks 
between firms and industry is created and maintained, government policy directed at 
merely ‘locating firms together’ appears to omit and/or ignore the most important and 
dynamic aspects of the industrial clustering process.  
 
The third issue concerns the record of Australian governments’ resource allocation as it 
pertains the development of industry cluster formation.  Feser and Bergman (2000) note 
that, at least at the regional level, the approach frequently adopted by policymakers 
involves little more than the identification of current regional specialisations as targets 
for traditional development initiatives.  In such cases, a cluster strategy serves more 
often as a means of allocating scarce resources than as a way to build the linkages and 
future inter-industry synergies documented so frequently in successful industrial 
districts (Feser & Bergman, 2000).  For example, in Europe, the US and Australia, 
many ‘planned’ clusters have failed to materialise despite heavy investments by 
government into ‘the required infrastructure’.  The implication is that although setting 
up the infrastructure may be paramount to the diffusion of industrial clusters, it is not 
sufficient in of itself to ensure a cluster’s formation and development. 
 
Underpinning these issues is the observed difficulty of Australian policy-makers to 
conceptualise their role within Porter’s DFM (Brown 2000; Enright & Roberts, 2001).  
Indeed, Brown (2000) suggests Australia’s poor IC performance is almost entirely 
predicated on the ‘confused role of government and its policy makers’, a statement 
echoed by Porter when he stated that: 
 
…in Australia, what is less understood is that the government has some 
positive roles, like innovation and training, infrastructure, and things like 
that.  I think that the real frontier is [understanding] the positive roles to be 
played by government whilst avoiding the distortion or intervention in 
competition (in Trinca, 2002:39). 
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In order to understand the positive roles that a government can play in the support of 
entrepreneurial activity and the development of innovative industrial clusters, this paper 
reports upon an examination of the 25-year history of one of Australia’s most 
innovative and internationally successful industry clusters, that of the Tasmanian Light 
Shipbuilding Industry (TLSI) cluster.  Since its inception, the TLSI cluster has grown 
substantially in terms of its sales volume, innovative output, and impact on the 
industry’s overall development as a world-class maritime producer (Industry Audit, 
1998).  At its peak between 1996 and 1998, the TLSI cluster generated an annual 
turnover of AUD$400 million (accounting for 25 percent of the state’s merchandise 
exports), and was fundamental in the development of an industry council that 
represented and coordinated the majority of the state’s maritime industry (Industry 
Audit, 1998).  Given its demonstrable importance to the regional Tasmanian economy, 
an examination of the TLSI cluster’s development provides an opportunity to observe 
the role that government played in the development of an innovative and internationally 
competitive industry cluster.   
 
Method. 
 
This research comprised a series of semi-structured interviews with all of the key 
informants within the TLSI cluster and the state government during the period 1977 to 
2002.  In particular, interviews were conducted with each of the state Premiers during 
the TLSI cluster’s formation, the managing directors of the TLSI cluster firms, and the 
heads of government departments and agencies with which the TLSI cluster had 
significant interactions. In total 25 semi-structured interviews were conducted, each 
lasting between 60 and 90 minutes.  The interview questions posed to the participants 
were derived from an extensive collection and analysis of historical data pertaining to 
the TLSI cluster’s development.  As such, the interviews contained both standardised 
interview questions (i.e. common to all informants) and specific interview questions 
(i.e. aimed at the key informants’ specific involvement in the TLSI cluster’s history), 
and were formulated to elicit the primary data required to answer the research questions 
posed in this inquiry.    
 
Both the standardised and specific interview questions were formulated to facilitate the 
aggregation, analysis, and validation of information, and enabled the researcher to 
interrogate the evidence gathered from other sources.  These questions were designed to 
cover the necessary issues, but were framed in an open-ended manner, to allow the 
interviewees sufficient latitude for introspection and open reporting of their own 
perspectives.  As a result, the informants were free to pursue those matters that they 
considered important.   
 
This collection of primary data using a semi-structured interview method allowed the 
informants to tell their own story in their own way, thereby allowing the researcher 
direct access to the experience of the case (Clandinin & Connelly, 1994).  These 
individualised recollections aid to strengthen the inquiry by counteracting the bias that 
may exist in the secondary documents (Burgess, 1982), by adding matters of fact or 
detail that may only be recorded in individual memory (Samuel, 1982), and by giving 
voice to those not usually heard (Fontana & Frey, 1994).  The semi-structured 
interviews assisted this inquiry in each of these areas, as they enabled the researcher to 
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access facets of the case that would not have been available by any other data gathering 
technique.  The interpretation of the data, and the verification of the conclusions, were 
facilitated by the use of the QSR NUD*IST software package.  The interview 
transcripts were imported into the NUD*IST software database, following which the 
categories (i.e. the coding of the data) were established as a series of nodes.  These 
nodes were initially generated from the themes highlighted in literature review process, 
formed part of an index system that allowed the researcher to categorise respondent data 
in terms of extant theory.  Each node was then reviewed in order to identify common 
themes necessary for the researcher’s second-round coding that underpins the discussion 
and conclusions in this paper.    
 
One of the most prevalent concerns surrounding the reporting of longitudinal industrial 
cluster research concerns the evolutionary nature of the industrial life cycle.  Peters and 
Hood (2000) discuss how the industrial life cycle notion can influence the effectiveness 
of a government’s industrial cluster policy platform.  A growing literature base suggests 
that ‘who innovates’ and ‘how much’ innovative activity is undertaken by an industry 
cluster is closely linked to the phase of the industry life cycle, and is of vital importance 
to effective policy implementation (Klepper, 1996; Leigh, 2003).  It is therefore 
necessary for this research to report on the longitudinal variation in government policy 
development, and link them to the needs of the TLSI cluster over its life cycle. 
 
Results. 
 
The role of government during introductory stage of the TLSI cluster’s life cycle. 
 
During the introductory stage of its life cycle, three key government roles positively 
influenced the TLSI cluster’s development.  The first was the state government’s initial 
non-committal stance towards the specific development of the state’s burgeoning 
shipbuilding industry.   The second role surrounded the enhancement of the state’s 
reputation within the domestic market as a centre for maritime research.  The third role 
was the government’s support for the entrepreneurial activities undertaken by Incat, 
when it became apparent that the company was a potential source of significant 
economic growth for the regional economy.  
 
The state government’s initial non-committal stance towards the state’s burgeoning 
industry was not a deliberate one, as its policy focus at the time was on the macro-
economic restructuring of the state’s economy away from its dependence on hydro-
industrialisation.   Due to this focus on the macro-economic restructuring process, the 
Tasmanian government did not at any stage pre-empt the growth requirements of the 
potential industry cluster.  As such, the Tasmanian government avoided the issues 
surrounding many of Australia’s industrial cluster failures of the 1990s in which 
governments built up the infrastructural support to potential industries in the hope that 
this would attract firms, as for example, the federal and South Australian government 
did with the failed multi-function polis planned for Adelaide.  Consequently, the 
development of the innovative technologies (i.e. the development of elements of 
Porter’s ‘firm strategy, structure and rivalry’) remained the sole responsibility of the 
private sector firms that existed during the industrial cluster’s initial formation (i.e. 
Clifford and his maritime friendship network).    
 
 
 
CRIC Cluster conference. Beyond Cluster- Current Practices & Future Strategies 
Ballarat, June 30-July 1, 2005 
8
 
Refereed Paper 
The second key role was the state government’s development of the region’s reputation 
within the broader domestic maritime market as a national centre for maritime research.  
The Tasmanian government implemented a series of lobbying initiatives that resulted in 
the federal government providing additional funding to the Australian Maritime College 
and relocating its national maritime research institute (the CSIRO) to Hobart.  These 
state government lobbying efforts were largely aimed at the federal government rather 
than the private sector, but their success had implications for the region’s ‘Factor 
Conditions’, ‘Related and Supporting Industry’, and ‘Local Demand Conditions’.   The 
regional economy’s factor conditions were advanced by developing the region’s supply 
of human capital through both the generation of specialised employment and education 
within the broader industry.  The regional economy’s related and supporting industry 
factor was advanced by the increase in the sophistication of supply of inputs to the 
private sector firms (in terms of products and world standard maritime research). The 
Tasmanian government’s enhancement of the region’s reputation helped to develop the 
demand conditions faced by the private sector shipbuilding firms, most significantly in 
the from of customers ready to import their products from interstate.   It was only after 
the domestic exporting success of Incat’s innovative semi-aluminium catamarans in the 
early 1980s were realised that the Tasmanian government undertook its third key role, 
that of accommodating the growth requirements of the innovative cluster firm.   
 
Although the Tasmanian government did provide its first direct support for Incat’s 
innovative management in the introductory stage of the TLSI cluster’s life cycle, it did 
so only after the firm was able to demonstrate the potential in the domestic Australian 
market for fast-ferry transportation.  The Tasmanian government’s support for Incat’s 
innovative capacity was provided only when the firm could demonstrate that it did not 
possess the resources required for its continued expansion.  The Tasmanian government 
also required evidence that their support of Incat’s expansion would result in additional 
jobs being created within the firm.   This initial government support is consistent with 
the recommendation of Porter’s ICT, as it allows for the challenges facing the 
burgeoning industry to be overcome whilst avoiding the inefficiencies associated with 
the government’s direct involvement in private sector enterprise. 
 
The role of government during the growth stage of the TLSI cluster’s life cycle. 
 
During the growth stage of its life cycle, three key government roles positively 
influenced the development of the TLSI cluster.  The first was the Tasmanian 
government’s continued effort to enhance the reputation of the regional economy, 
although the focus of these efforts changed from a focus on the domestic maritime 
market to one that encompassed the international market for Incat’s fast-ferries.  The 
second was the Tasmanian government’s direct involvement in Incat’s sales and 
negotiation processes with their international customers.  The third was the Tasmanian 
government’s policy initiatives that served to maximise the synergistic relationship that 
existed between Incat and its ‘supplier firms’. 
 
The first of the state government policies that positively influenced the development of 
the TLSI cluster was the continued enhancement of the region’s reputation as a centre 
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for maritime excellence, although the policy’s focus changed markedly to encompass 
the international marketplace.  This change in focus was driven by the continued 
success of Incat’s innovative product line in the domestic ferry transportation market.  
Through the use of government sponsored trade missions and the associated negotiation 
activities, the Tasmanian government used the success of Incat to illustrate the region’s 
maritime competency to international buyers of these products, in turn facilitating an 
increase in the international demand conditions for Incat’s production.  The Tasmanian 
government also applied pressure on the remainder of the TLSI cluster firms, and 
indeed the region’s maritime industry as a whole, to similarly increase the quality of 
their production in line with the growing international reputation of the region.  The 
Tasmanian government helped the region’s shipbuilding and maritime manufacturing 
firms to achieve high quality production by maintaining its existing lobbying efforts for 
additional infrastructural funding for the industry.  
 
Specifically, the Tasmanian government undertook political action to secure additional 
funding for the educational and R&D requirements of the industry.  As with its direct 
support for Incat’s needs, however, the Tasmanian government only lobbied for 
additional federal government funding after its need was recognised by the private 
sector, and where the private sector firms could demonstrate that these needs were 
necessary for their future growth.  The Tasmanian government’s reputation 
enhancement strategy served to increase the Demand Conditions enjoyed by the state’s 
shipbuilding industry, and in particular, for the output of the regional industry’s 
innovative firm, Incat.  It also served to apply a degree of pressure upon the Incat’s 
suppliers to similarly improve their production output in line with the growing prestige 
of the region. 
 
The second role undertaken by the Tasmanian government was that of direct support 
during Incat’s sales negotiations with their potential international customers.  This was 
directed by the incumbent state Premier at the time, through his department of 
economic development, most notably in the form of funding for international customer 
visits to Incat’s factory, but also by having the Premier accompany the potential 
customer during their visit.  As a result of the state government’s policy initiative to 
become involved in Incat’s sales negotiation process, it provided a level of prestige, 
moral support and sales expertise that was otherwise beyond the ability of the hub-firm 
to provide.  Indirectly, this policy also served to highlight the supplier firms within the 
TLSI cluster, as their inputs into Incat’s final product were also supported by the state 
government’s involvement in the sale.    
 
In terms of advancing the Diamond Factors, the Tasmanian government’s second policy 
initiative served to develop the regional industry’s firm strategy, structure and rivalry by 
state Premier’s personal endorsement of the TLSI cluster’s output.  It also served to 
align the TLSI cluster firms’ goals with that of the state government by pressuring all of 
the individual firms to innovate their products in line with the requirements of the 
innovative Incat.  In terms of advancing the Demand Conditions enjoyed by the regional 
industry, the Tasmanian government’s involvement served to enhance the legitimacy of 
Incat’s product to potential international customers.  
 
The third key role undertaken by the Tasmanian state government was to undertake 
measures to deliberately maximise the synergistic relationship that existed between 
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Incat and its supplier firms.  Inherent in Porter’s ICT is the notion that within a clustered 
network of firms, some forms of scale or scope economies exist through which the 
industrial cluster develops an internationally competitive advantage.  Through its 
development of marine parks and industrial councils (in which firms complementary to 
Incat’s operations can more easily interact) the Tasmanian government deliberately 
enabled the realisation of the synergies of both scale and scope inherent to the region’s 
natural industry.   The third state government role served to advance the diamond 
factors by developing the ‘firm strategy, structure and rivalry’ and the ‘Factor 
Conditions’ enjoyed by the TLSI cluster firms in residence at the Prince of Wales Bay 
marine park in Hobart.  With the TLSI cluster firms in close geographic proximity, the 
individual firms were better able to communicate and coordinate their interrelated 
production and training activities, as well as allowing them to access the advanced and 
specialised (and expensive) infrastructure developed for the marine park.   
 
The role of government during the maturity stage of the TLSI cluster’s life cycle. 
 
During the maturity stage of its life cycle, three key government roles positively 
influenced the development of the TLSI cluster.  The first key role was the continued 
enhancement of the regional economy’s reputation as a world centre for maritime 
manufacturing excellence, although the focus of its efforts changed from the singular 
promotion of Incat’s success to incorporate the production of the entire set of industry 
members, be they cluster firms or otherwise.  The second role was to formalise the 
relationships that existed within the regional shipbuilding and marine manufacturing 
industries.  The third role was the government’s deliberate strategy to dilute Incat’s 
importance and impact upon the regional economy. 
 
The first key government role was its continued enhancement of the regional economy’s 
reputation as a world centre for maritime manufacturing excellence. During the maturity 
stage however, the focus of the Tasmanian government’s reputation strategy in the 
world shipping vessel market changed from the singular promotion of Incat’s success to 
incorporate the output of the entire industry, be they TLSI cluster firms or otherwise.  
The functional strategies incorporated by the Tasmanian government included trade 
missions, direct involvement in the international sales negotiations process, and the 
provision of marketing assistance to the industry.  The marketing assistance provided to 
the industry was specifically targeted at generating a consistent message for all of 
Tasmanian firms in the international marketplace.   
 
The policy to incorporate the entire set of cluster firms developed the demand 
conditions for the regional industry, with the region now marketed as a ‘one-stop-shop’ 
for a wide variety of innovative and high-quality maritime production, not simply fast 
catamaran production.  The state government could afford to undertake this marketing 
strategy given the success that the TLSI cluster firms had enjoyed both individually, and 
as a network, during the growth phase.  For example, by the end of the growth stage of 
the TLSI cluster’s development, each of the supplier firms had secured their own export 
sales independent of those associated with their alliance with Incat.  Further to this, two 
additional TLSI cluster firms, Liferaft Systems and Richardson Devine, emerged within 
the industry and enjoyed immediate export success, largely due to their association with 
Incat and the innovative and valuable nature of their output.   
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The second key role was to formalise the relationship between the region’s entire set of 
shipbuilders and maritime manufacturers (TLSI cluster firms or otherwise) and the state 
government.  After the Prince of Wales Bay maritime park was established by the 
Tasmanian government, the private sector firms, along with the Aluminium Welding 
School, formed the Tasmanian Maritime Network (TMN) within which the TLSI cluster 
could better develop its communications and lobbying efforts.  After the Bacon Labor 
government’s industry audit program of 1998 was completed, the TMN was 
restructured to form an ‘Industry Council’ that represented approximately 85 percent of 
the region’s shipbuilding and marine manufacturing firms.  The Industry Council 
program sought to provide the region’s shipbuilding industry with a direct 
communication and lobbying channel between the industry as a whole and the 
Tasmanian government.  The Industry Council arrangement also helped to ensure that 
that the set of firms within the industry could better incorporate the success factors of 
the TLSI cluster into their operations, and therefore become involved in the process of 
further developing the regional industry’s ‘Firm Strategy Structure and Rivalry’ to 
comply with world-best standards.   
 
The third key role was the Tasmanian government’s strategy to dilute Incat’s 
importance and impact within the regional economy.  The policy was implemented 
through the attraction of additional innovative shipbuilding firms to the region 
(producing vessels unlike those of Incat) in the hope that the TLSI cluster’s supplier 
firms would have alternate sources of sales opportunities incremental to that of Incat.  
The Tasmanian government was able to attract additional innovative firms through 
marketing the region’s advanced infrastructure, support that was initially provided 
solely for the benefit of Incat.  Where needed, the Tasmanian government also provided 
the option to undertake an equity arrangement with the new hub-firms, an arrangement 
that involved funding of the new firms’ relocation and start-up costs, but did not 
involve the state government intervening in the innovative process of the firm.  This 
policy initiative had a direct impact on the diamond factors enjoyed by the TLSI cluster 
(and indeed the entire industry) by effectively driving incremental demand from the 
international marketplace for region’s maritime production.  In addition, it allowed the 
TLSI cluster’s supplier firms to develop exponentially greater linkages within the 
industry, and more importantly, with firms of similar importance as the original hub-
firm in terms of their innovative ability and supply requirements.   
 
The travel and trading needs of the isolated Tasmanian community necessitated the 
development of an advanced and innovative shipbuilding industry evidently capable of 
dominating the domestic market.  This historical dependence resulted in the growth of 
the island population’s human capital in terms of a competency in innovative 
shipbuilding and design.  More specifically, the interest in shipbuilding and design 
within the state was shared amongst a rather close network of individuals that enjoyed a 
long association with the industry.  As such, the development of the island population’s 
innovative shipbuilding competencies (i.e. human capital) aligns closely with 
Coleman’s (1988) concept of social capital, whereby a population invest in a closed 
social network through which they gain access to embedded resources and knowledge 
that serve to enhance the returns of their common activities.  This is demonstrated by 
the latent shipbuilding competencies that remained within Tasmania’s shipbuilding 
industry despite its decline to virtually nil export production during the 1970s.   
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Despite the observed failure of Australia’s protectionist policies in the globalising 
environment of the 1970s and 1980s, after the consequences of the Tasman Bridge 
tragedy became apparent (see Clarence City Website, 2005), Tasmania’s shipbuilding 
industry managed to grow its exports sales from virtually nil in the 1970s, to 40 percent 
of the global market for fast ferry transport.   The implication of this contextual analysis 
suggests that chance events (here represented by the Tasman Bridge tragedy) may be 
viewed as ‘economically relevant’ given that the implications of its occurrence align 
closely with the human (and in this instance, social) capital that had developed within 
the region.   
 
 
 
 
Discussion. 
 
The implications for the role of government in the development of a regional 
economy’s industrial clusters are five-fold.  The first implication surrounds the state 
government’s initial response to the potential formation of an industrial cluster.  In the 
TLSI cluster case study, the research indicates that the state government’s initial 
support for any emergent entrepreneurial activity must be commensurate with its 
relevance to the region’s natural advantages (and/or historical dependence) and the 
likelihood of their commercial success in export markets.  The reverse holds that state 
government need to be aware that supporting entrepreneurial activity that does not 
closely align with the region’s natural advantages and store of social capital may be 
likely to relocate their activity as more cost effective opportunities arise.    
 
The second implication surrounds the importance of the government’s role within 
Porter’s DFM.  The research indicates that the government of a regional Australian 
economy needs to position itself as an endogenous variable within Porter’s (1990) 
DFM.  That is, the government of a regional Australian economy cannot positively and 
effectively influence economic growth as an exogenous variable as assumed in the 
Porter’s original theory.  Instead, the government of a regional Australian economy has 
a significant role to play in its development (given its relative size to the region’s gross 
domestic product), and the Diamond Factor Model requires some alteration to reflect 
this central role (see Figure 2). Despite the intrusive role required by the government in 
the regional economy, it is important to note that at no stage did the state government 
seek to influence the innovative nature of the industry, which was always left in the 
hands of the private sector and its entrepreneurs.   
 
Similarly, the incorporation of chance events into a government’s industrial cluster 
policy framework is also reasonable.  In Porter’s original ICT, chance events, alongside 
the role of government, are viewed as exogenous variables that may impact on an 
economy’s diamond factors from time to time.  Given the findings of this research, 
chance events that align closely with the human and social capital generated within an 
economy may be viewed as ‘economically relevant’, and therefore, play a boundary 
setting role within which internationally competitive industrial clusters may be 
effectively developed by the government’s interaction with the diamond factors.   
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The third implication is that the role of the government in a regional Australian 
economy is necessarily variable over the life cycle of the industry cluster, and as a result 
it needs to have the capability to identify and monitor the set of natural industries that 
exist within the region, and their stage of development.  It is also important for the 
government to avoid the adoption of a ‘one size fits all’ policy regime for its set of 
industrial clusters, as each will have its own requirements given their own particular 
stage of development.  Central to this point is the need for government to be able to 
recognise the existing and potential synergies that exist within the industry cluster, and 
therefore be better able to aid the optimisation of this idiosyncratic relationship, 
however at all times aware not to artificially create the synergy within the industry 
cluster.   
 
The fourth implication of this research is that government must provide the required 
infrastructural needs of the developing industrial cluster, however, the manner of its 
provision is clearly demonstrated by the Tasmanian government in this case.  Firstly, 
the needs of the industrial cluster were never pre-empted by the government.  Instead, 
the government awaited a claim from the private sector firms, with demonstrable 
evidence that without its provision, growth and employment within the industry cluster 
would decline.   
 
The fifth implication is the need for the government to actively dilute the importance of 
the original hub-firm to the regional economy as the sophistication of its supplier firms 
similarly advances.  It is necessary to safeguard the hub-firm’s suppliers (and indeed the 
region’s entire set of industry members) against reliance upon one major entity for their 
sales growth.  Possible methods to achieve this end include the introduction of new hub-
firms to the region such that they can benefit from the advanced diamond factors that 
exist there (creating a set of hub-firms for the supplier firms to interact with), and to 
apply a positive influence upon these firms to take steps in securing their own discrete 
export sales.   
 
Given the above discussion, Figure 2 presents a plausible alternative DFM for industrial 
cluster development in a regional Australian economy.   In line with the research 
findings, the ‘Role of Government’ is altered from an exogenous variable to one that is 
central, and necessarily intrusive in the regional economic development process.  As 
demonstrated in the discussion section, the key to an effective government role centres 
on the timing of its policy initiatives and the changing life cycle needs of the industry 
cluster. Similarly, ‘Chance Events’ are incorporated into the adapted model, and 
although they are represented here as an important variable, their occurrence is not 
considered essential to the development of internationally competitive industrial 
clusters.  Instead, ‘Chance Events’ are characterised as occurrences that serve to initiate 
industrial clustering activities.  The region’s store of social capital is also incorporated 
into the adapted model.  Although it may lie dormant for some considerable length of 
time, the variable represents the set of intangible economic assets possessed by a 
region’s labour market, which may also serve as a basis for the formation of the regional 
economy’s internationally competitive industrial clusters. 
 
Figure 2: Porter’s Diamond Factor Model adapted for a regional Australian 
economy. 
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Conclusion. 
 
The findings of this research indicate that the role of government in a regional 
Australian economy is far more significant than the exogenous one theorised by Porter 
(1990).  Indeed, an analysis of the TLSI cluster’s development indicates that the role of 
an Australian government is an endogenous, and arguably central to the machinations of 
the DFM for a regional Australian economy.  As such, for the purposes of providing a 
role for an Australian government in a regional economy, the variable cannot be 
considered exogenous to the diamond factors associated with Porter’s ICT.  Rather, the 
role of government must be considered fully integrated within the original diamond 
factors, indicating that it is directly involved in their development, and indeed very 
generation over time. 
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The findings of this research also indicate that theorising the role of chance events 
within a regional economic model also requires some attention.  Under Porter’s original 
DFM, chance events are similarly considered exogenous to the diamond factor’s 
interaction, and the role that the government has to play in the development of industrial 
clusters.  This research indicates that the role of the government may be directly 
influenced by those chance events that serve to amplify the commercial importance of 
regional economy’s Diamond Factors.  As such, the adapted model for a regional 
Australian economy includes an integrative link between the original diamond factors, 
and the occurrence of ‘Chance Events’ that serve to amplify their commercial value in 
the international market.  It similarly indicates that the region’s policy makers should 
view chance events that do not coincide with the ‘natural advantages’ or the advanced 
social capital developed within the region with some caution.  The research also 
 
Refereed Paper 
indicates that the adapted model must consider the region’s store of social capital as an 
important variable in the development of internationally competitive industrial clusters.  
Unlike the economy’s factor conditions, which refer largely to physical assets, the 
region’s store of social capital refers to the latent or tacit knowledge possessed by an 
economy’s labour market, their cultural understanding (based upon the region’s 
historical dependencies) and their belief that efforts to leverage this knowledge and 
understanding in the marketplace will lead to commercial success.   
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